T his article examines how multiple ownership changes unfold in international equity joint venture (IEJV) evolution and how such repeated changes impact short-term performance and long-term survival. By theorizing a new concept-the trap of continual change-in the IEJV context, we challenge the adaptive viewpoint assumed in alliance dynamics research. We propose that partners sometimes respond to an initial dissatisfaction with the venture result with a dysfunctional repetition of rearranging the ownership control structure. This continual change locks the organization into bad choices and sends it into a downward spiral. Acknowledging the mixed motive nature of inter-partner relationships, we incorporate cooperative versus competitive dynamics manifested in shared control arrangements. We propose that shared ownership control lends stability to the IEJV until the initial IEJV agreement is renegotiated; this stability is a result of the cooperative forces of mutual interdependence and mutual forbearance between the partners. However, when the power balance breaks down, the potential for inter-partner conflict increases. When the ownership control structure of the IEJV is restructured, especially multiple times, shared control arrangements become increasingly unstable as behavioral, cultural, and managerial differences are amplified.
Introduction
The initial focus of international equity joint venture (IEJV) research was on the formation stage (e.g., Banks 1987, Buckley and Casson 1988) . As the field developed, the focus shifted to IEJV termination (e.g., Kogut 1989, Park and Russo 1996) , but with little attention paid to analyzing the middle stages of IEJV evolution. This oversight can be attributed to the conventional assumption that IEJVs rarely change once they are formed (Yan and Luo 2001) . Although formation-and termination-oriented IEJV research clearly has significant value, it overlooks what is arguably the most dynamic part of the IEJV story: post-formation changes that occur in the middle of IEJV evolution.
A new stream of research that focuses on alliance dynamics has recently emerged. Basing their work on a small number of conceptual models (e.g., Koza and Lewin 1998, Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and case studies (e.g., de la Torre 1998, Doz 1996) , researchers have started to investigate the determinants of post-formation governance change (e.g., Dussauge et al. 2000 . However, these researchers have tended to view a mid-stage change as an end consequence of alliance development, without looking beyond the initial post-formation change. Such research is certainly valuable for tracing contributing factors to initial post-formation change; however, it limits our understanding of the dynamics of the multiple ownership changes that often occur in the middle of IEJV evolution.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide insight regarding the dynamics of multiple, sequential structural changes in the process of IEJV evolution. We examine how multiple waves of ownership change unfold in the middle stages of IEJV evolution, and we investigate how such repeated changes impact shortterm performance and long-term survival. The adaptive viewpoint is assumed in much of the alliance dynamics research (Arino and de la Torre 1998 , Das and Teng 2002 , Doz 1996 , Dussauge et al. 2000 , Koza and Lewin 1998 , Kumar and Nti 1998 , Reuer and Arino 2002 , Ring and Van de Ven 1994 ). In contrast, we emphasize that repeatedly rearranging the ownership control structure locks firms into bad choices and triggers additional (often escalating) problems. To that end, we theorize a new concept: the "trap" of continual change. In our analysis of 5,053 IEJVs operating between 1986 and 2003, we find that even if partners reorganize the ownership control structure of the IEJV as a result of an initial dissatisfaction with the venture performance, the continual change process is likely to position the IEJV unfavorably in the long run, because the process of change itself may greatly disrupt interpartner routines and relationships. Our analysis indicates that a continual change process starts to hurt IEJV performance after two iterations.
Paucity in Alliance and IEJV Literature
Alliance dynamics research is largely based on deductive theoretical approaches and conceptual models (e.g., Das and Teng 2002 , Khanna et al. 1998 , Koza and Lewin 1998 , Kumar and Nti 1998 , Ring and Van de Ven 1994 , with a few case-based empirical studies in this stream (e.g., de la Torre 1998, Doz 1996) . However, survey-based empirical studies are relatively scarce (e.g., Dussauge et al. 2000 . Researchers in this emerging stream state that the root of alliance dynamics research lies in the IEJV instability literature, but most of the studies have emphasized a positive, adaptive dynamic (e.g., Arino and de la Torre 1998 , Das and Teng 2002 , Doz 1996 , Dussauge et al. 2000 , Koza and Lewin 1998 , Kumar and Nti 1998 , Reuer and Arino 2002 , Ring and Van de Ven 1994 , Yan and Gray 1994 . Linking alliance dynamics with the IEJV instability literature helps to conceptualize a negative implication of the post-formation change process. Given that instability is one face of the dynamic, the conventional adaptive viewpoint proposed by much of the previous research needs to be balanced with another viewpoint, which is proposed in this paper.
Much of the IEJV instability research has largely focused on IEJV termination (e.g., Barkema et al. 1996; Franko 1971; Gomes-Casseres 1987; Harrigan 1988; Hennart et al. 1998; Kogut 1989 Kogut , 1991 Park and Russo 1996; Pennings et al. 1994; Reuer 2002) . As a result, IEJV instability research has been dominated by a static approach that emphasizes the end consequence of IEJV evolution (Doz 1996 , Parkhe 1993a . Similarly, the emerging empirical research on alliance dynamics (e.g., Reuer and Arino 2002, Reuer et al. 2002) has treated alliance governance change as a dependent variable, without looking beyond initial post-formation change. Such an approach limits our understanding of longitudinal dynamics, especially as most of the research treats post-formation governance change as a single, isolated event. To properly examine the longitudinal dynamics of mid-stage development and termination of IEJVs, we need to examine IEJV instability in relation to timing. IEJVs do not change from stable to unstable the night before they terminate. Thus, we focus on the sequential nature of multiple ownership changes surrounding both the mid-stage development and end-destination of the IEJV and investigate the relationship between sequential mid-stage changes and termination in an attempt to improve our understanding of the longitudinal dynamics of IEJV instability.
A central construct of the IEJV instability literature has been the division of equity ownership control, because the equity ownership division between partners in the equity-based joint venture plays a central role in shaping the configuration of governance structure (Beamish and Banks 1987 , Grossman and Hart 1986 , Hennart 1988 , Killing 1982 , Kogut 1988 , Lu and Hebert 2005 , Milgrom and Roberts 1992 . However, findings on the relationship between equity ownership division and IEJV instability have been equivocal. Whereas some researchers have found that a shared equity ownership control structure is more stable than the ownership structure dominated by one partner (e.g., Beamish 1985 Beamish , 1993 Beamish and Banks 1987; Blodgett 1992; Harrigan and Newman 1990; Lee and Beamish 1995; Parkhe 1993b; Reuer 2002; Saxton 1997; Yan and Gray 1996) , others have found the reverse (e.g., Hambrick et al. 2001 , Killing 1983 , Kogut 1988 , Pennings et al. 1994 , Shenkar and Yan 2002 , Yan and Gray 2001 . The mixed findings may be attributable at least in part to the fact that previous research generally took a static approach and examined the "if" question of shared ownership control. Employing a more dynamic approach in the context of multiple waves of ownership change, we attempt to answer the "when" question.
The IEJV instability literature also lacks definitive answers on the relationship between IEJV performance and instability. Some researchers have suggested that IEJV instability is an indication of performance failure (e.g., Geringer and Hebert 1991 , Harrigan 1988 , Killing 1983 , Parkhe 1991 , Pennings et al. 1994 . Others have questioned the relationship between instability and performance (e.g., Beamish and Inkpen 1995 , GomesCasseres 1987 , Hamel et al. 1989 , Hennart et al. 1998 , Yan and Zeng 1999 . But most research to date has not considered these variables together; it is therefore not surprising that findings regarding the relationship have been equivocal. To provide a more holistic understanding of the performance-instability relationship, we investigate the relationships among IEJV performance, mid-stage structural change, and termination.
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development
Consistent with the negative normative implication of the IEJV instability literature, in theorizing the "trap" of continual change, we emphasize the downward spiral created by partners who continually change the IEJV structure. Various types of organizational traps are proposed in the literature: a power trap, a failure trap, and a success trap (Levinthal and March 1993) ; an oscillation trap and a follow-the-leaders trap (Lant and Mezias 1990) ; and a familiarity trap, a maturity trap, and a propinquity trap (Ahuja and Lampert 2001) . However, Levitt and March's (1988) competency trap is the most fundamental one. Levitt and March first proposed that an organization is sometimes trapped by its own learning and inertia; they coined the term competency trap to define what happens "when favorable performance with an inferior procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience with it, thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it rewarding to use" (p. 322). In this paper, we theorize a trap of continual change based on the theoretical underpinnings of Levitt and March's (1988) competency trap: organizational routines, history dependency, and organizational inertia. Levitt and March's (1988) competency trap points to a great deal of ambiguity in the members' interpretations of organizational experience in the change process. Particularly in the mixed motive environment of the IEJV, in which partners cooperate but also compete with each other (Kogut 1989, Shenkar and Yan 2002) , the continual change process may cause inter-partner conflicts. Inter-partner IEJV relationships are inherently conflict laden, because the partners may have divergent strategic objectives (Killing 1982 , Li and Shenkar 1996 , Pearce 1997 , different national cultures (Child and Markóczy 1993, Park and Ungson 1997) , and dissimilar corporate cultures (Datta 1988, Fey and . In addition, there is always the potential for opportunism Russo 1996, Parkhe 1993b) . Whereas the cooperative force supports collective interests and mutual benefits, the competitive force emphasizes opportunism and zero-sum games (Hambrick et al. 2008 , Khanna et al. 1998 . In this mixed motive inter-partner relationship, the shared control arrangement of the IEJV can be the foundation on which the cooperative partnership is built, but it can also be a source of conflict when the balance of power between partners shifts in the change process.
The IEJV instability literature bases its conceptualization of the cooperative versus competitive dynamics of the inter-partner relationship on the division of equity ownership control between the partners. Some researchers argue that when the ownership control of the IEJV is more evenly distributed between partners, the partners are more likely to adhere to the cooperative logic of mutual interdependence and forbearance (Beamish 1985 , Beamish and Banks 1987 , Blodgett 1992 . In contrast, other researchers argue that a higher level of shared ownership control is more likely to trigger substantive and relationship conflicts between partners (Hambrick et al. 2001 , Killing 1983 , Pennings et al. 1994 . One stream of IEJV instability research subscribes to the positive interaction aspect of shared ownership control, while the other emphasizes the negative friction aspect of shared ownership control. We use Poole and Van de Ven's (1989) temporal separation approach, which emphasizes the role of transition and time. We argue that the cooperative and competitive dynamics of shared ownership control are separated by different evolutionary stages, and that in the process of IEJV evolution, each opposing force dominates in turn.
We do not argue that IEJVs change simply for the sake of change, but rather that they change in response to perceived pressures. Instead of starting with initial change in a vacuum, we set up a parsimonious initial changetriggering point based on Donaldson's (1987) Structural Adjustment to Regain Fit (SARFIT) formulation. The SARFIT posits that the need for structural change does not arise directly from changes in internal/external contingencies; rather, the need for structural change arises from poor organizational performance, which in turn results from a poor fit between organizational structure and contingency variables (Donaldson 1987 (Donaldson , 2001 ). The SARFIT hinges on the feedback effect of performance as the mediating cause of structural change, thus avoiding the need to exhaustively incorporate various antecedents of structural change, such as environmental, industry, parent firm, or IEJV contingencies. Many researchers have investigated various contributing factors to initial post-formation change (Blodgett 1992 , Dussauge et al. 2000 , Gomes-Casseres 1987 , Hamel 1991 , Harrigan 1988 , Harrigan and Newman 1990 , Inkpen and Beamish 1997 , Kogut 1989 , Reuer and Arino 2002 , Yan and Gray 1994 . Because we address the midstage part of IEJV evolution, our intent is to extend the emerging stream of alliance dynamics research by focusing on the multiple waves of structural change once an initial post-formation change occurs. A schematic representation of our research model is shown in Figure 1 .
Initial Change-Triggering Point
According to the SARFIT model, poor organizational performance triggers adaptive structural change from a misfit to a fit position (Donaldson 1987 (Donaldson , 2001 ). This stance reflects the adaptive perspective found in the organization literature (Aguilera et al. 2008 , Chandler 1962 , Lawrence and Lorsch 1968 , Parker and van Witteloostuijn 2010 and in the alliance/IEJV literature (Koza and Lewin 1998 , Reuer and Arino 2002 , Yan and Gray 1994 . The adaptive perspective suggests that when poor performance indicates reduced satisfaction with the existing ownership control structure, partners can make an adaptive structural change to match the needs of the new environment in hopes of restoring IEJV performance. Accordingly, we set up a departure point for this study as follows.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Poor IEJV performance triggers initial change in ownership control structure. 
Occurrence of Multiple Ownership Changes

Main Effects of Prior Changes on Subsequent
Changes. Our theorization of the trap of continual change is based on the theoretical underpinnings of Levitt and March's (1988) competency trap: organizational routines (Cyert and March 1963, Nelson and Winter 1982) , history dependency (Lindblom 1959 , Steinbruner 1974 , and organizational inertia (Carroll 1984, Hannan and Freeman 1984) . An organization can be defined as a structured system of routines, which are the repetitive patterns of activities by organizational members (Cyert and March 1963, Nelson and Winter 1982) . The notion of competency traps is based on this routine-based model, in which organizations tend to behave in the future according to previously used routines (Levitt and March 1988) . According to this model, an organization evolves in a history-dependent way, in that today's operating routines restrict an organization's available procedures in the future for producing outputs, acquiring resources, and coordinating the activities of members.
Over time, organizations develop not only operating routines but also modification routines. Modification routines are procedures for changing and creating operating routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) . Typically, modification routines govern the change process through which organizations search for solutions to emerging problems (Levitt and March 1988) . In this process, IEJVs learn to change by actually changing, because routinizing change processes requires experience in modifying operating routines (Amburgey et al. 1993) . Therefore, when an IEJV gains more experience in changing its operating routines, it is more likely to develop the modification routines needed to make further, similar changes.
Researchers using the routine-based model of organizations generally conceptualize inertia as a tendency to routinely repeat past actions and patterns of activities (Amburgey et al. 1993, Li and Rowley 2002) . Here, inertia can be understood as the force binding the nexus of routines that shape organizations (Levitt and March 1988) . Organizational and managerial knowledge, capabilities, beliefs, values, and memory are embodied in routines. However, when routines cross hard-todefine boundaries to become tendencies or entrenched responses to wider ranges of problems, forces related to inertia emerge and gain strength (Hannan and Freeman 1984) . Inertia has dual implications: stasis and uniform motion. When maintaining original structures, adhering to old routines, and resisting change, organizations are said to exhibit stasis inertia. However, another form of inertia-referred to as momentum (Amburgey and Miner 1992) -results when past changes are repeated in accordance with modification routines. In this sense, inertia can be described as being at a high level when organizations extend or repeat past trends, regardless of whether or not they continue to maintain an environment of stasis or continual change (Kelly and Amburgey 1991) .
Just as a particular type of change made in the past is especially likely to be repeated in the future, the more an IEJV changes its ownership control structure, the more often it will develop modification routines for making additional ownership control changes. In turn, additional experience with ownership control changes (as well as with modification routines) makes it more likely that an IEJV will view additional ownership changes as appropriate solutions to a broader range of subsequent problems. Unless an IEJV's environment is unusually calm, the organization will always have to deal with a steady stream of problems, in response to which the modification routines are repeatedly enacted to effect similar changes. Marginal costs tied to making specific types of changes are reduced when competence in making those changes is increased (Amburgey et al. 1993) . A decrease in the cost of changing has two related effects: it makes changes with fewer prospective benefits more attractive, and it increases the likelihood that further, similar changes will be repeatedly enacted. Less often considered is the question of whether or not problems are actually solved by the changes. Supporters of additional changes tend to view failures as indicators of sluggish devotion to a change policy rather than of symptoms of a bad change policy (Levitt and March 1988) . They also interpret objectives and outcomes in ways that create images of success, regardless of actual outcomes (Levinthal and March 1993) .
Therefore, ownership changes can become routinized so that they occur regardless of their potentially dysfunctional consequences or the lack of any discernable consequences at all (Levinthal and March 1993, Levitt and March 1988) . As a result, momentum for additional ownership change may develop into the trap of continual ownership change, with each occurrence of ownership change increasing the potential for its recurrence. The following hypothesis reflects this view.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The likelihood of equity ownership change in an IEJV increases with each sequential equity ownership change.
Interaction Effects Between Prior Changes and Shared Ownership Control on Subsequent Changes.
The fundamental logic behind IEJV formation is to gain access to complementary resources and capabilities (Buckley and Casson 1988) . To ensure that their contributions are transformed into positive outcomes, partners must maintain their awareness of the need for cooperation (Mohr and Spekman 1994) . In the equitybased inter-partner relationship, the extent to which partners cooperate with each other depends on their mutual investment and involvement in the relationship (Saxton 1997) . Equal distribution of ownership control creates mutual interdependence and forbearance, because a roughly equal balance of power puts pressure on both sides to make accommodations to preserve the cooperative partnership (Blodgett 1992) . Similarly, the stability of the inter-partner relationship relies on a mutual hostage condition between partners (Chen and Hennart 2004; Kogut 1988) . The stronger the mutual hostage condition between IEJV partners, the stronger the partners' incentive to suppress opportunistic actions (Parkhe 1993b) . Emphasizing the cooperative nature of the shared ownership control structure, many IEJV researchers suggest that the more evenly shared the ownership between partners, the more likely the creation of a condition of mutual interdependence and forbearance that will lend stability to the IEJV relationship (Beamish and Banks 1987 , Harrigan and Newman 1990 , Reuer 2002 . On the basis of this rationale, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The more equally the equity ownership control is shared between IEJV partners, the less likely the initial post-formation change in the ownership control structure.
However, different dynamics emerge when the initial power balance breaks down as a result of an initial structural change. In IEJVs, a shared ownership control arrangement is the foundation on which a cooperative inter-partner relationship is initially built, but it can also be a source of conflict if the balance of power breaks down. The IEJV is a mixed motive game of cooperative and competitive dynamics (Hamel et al. 1989 , Kogut 1989 . Inherent tensions always exist, and because of divergent strategic objectives and different national and corporate cultures there is always the potential for opportunism (Child and Markóczy 1993 , Fey and Beamish 2001 , Li and Shenkar 1996 , Parkhe 1993a ). In the beginning, a shared control arrangement based on mutual investment and involvement is a signaling and monitoring mechanism, resulting in the inherent tensions laying dormant (Saxton 1997) . However, inter-partner dependences inevitably change over time; renegotiation of the initial IEJV agreement is an obvious sign that resource and power dependences between partners have changed (Harrigan and Newman 1990, Inkpen and Beamish 1997) .
Whereas interaction is a cooperative manifestation of shared control arrangement between partners, friction reflects its competitive aspect. Given that a shared control arrangement entails a high potential for inter-partner friction, behavioral, cultural, and managerial differences tend to be amplified when the complementary link negotiated at the IEJV formation stage becomes strained in the change process. In this climate, partners with more evenly shared ownership control are more likely to experience inter-partner friction, because even distribution of power is not necessarily reasonable after changes in stakes. Therefore, partners are likely to jockey for better position as they become increasingly sensitive to how much ownership control they have (Hambrick et al. 2001) . A number of researchers emphasize the competitive nature of the shared ownership control structure and argue that more evenly shared ownership control is more likely to incur relationship instability due to inter-partner conflicts (Killing 1983 , Kogut 1988 , Pennings et al. 1994 , Shenkar and Yan 2002 , Yan and Gray 1994 . Whereas the previous studies suggested the competitive nature of the equal ownership distribution in a static context, we discuss the competitive manifestation of equal ownership distribution in a change context. In our context, shared control is a tugof-war in which the balance of power is maintained at the beginning; although the relationship resulting from this initial balance is seemingly stable, it is in fact under constant tension. The inherent tension of the shared control relationship exerts itself when this initial balance breaks down.
There is a high potential for conflict in the change process. Partners with more evenly shared ownership control are more likely to experience substantive conflict as partners strategically and operationally oppose each other's agendas, priorities, and choices (Hambrick et al. 2001) . Furthermore, strategic and operational disagreements arising from substantive conflicts can become personalized, thereby causing relationship conflicts (Hambrick 1995) . Relationship conflict is based on interpersonal incompatibilities that result in mistrust, animosity, and annoyance. Substantive and relationship conflicts are conceptually distinct, but they have been found to interact reciprocally, often propelling each other (Jehn 1997) . For example, relationship conflicts increase the likelihood that another substantive conflict will emerge, thus triggering a downward spiral that generates additional changes in the IEJV ownership control structure. In such a climate, partners with greater bargaining power may try to boost their ownership control, while weakened partners try to regain their initial positions by restoring their lost ownership control (Inkpen and Beamish 1997) . As the downward spiral continues, partners are likely to renegotiate their positions several times, resulting in multiple waves of ownership change (Shenkar and Yan 2002) . As each sequential ownership change occurs, IEJVs become increasingly unstable. On the basis of this rationale, we hypothesize the interaction effects between prior ownership changes and shared ownership control on subsequent changes as follows.
Hypothesis 4 (H4).
Once an initial ownership change has occurred, the more equally the equity ownership control is shared between partners, the more likely further changes will occur in the ownership control structure.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). As each sequential change occurs, the positive relationship between shared equity ownership control and further ownership change in an IEJV continually escalates.
Outcomes of Multiple Ownership Changes
Short-Term Performance. In response to an initial dissatisfaction with the IEJV result, partners may reorganize control relations and implement new ownership control structures to match changing contingencies in internal and external environments (Harrigan and Newman 1990) . Reorganization of ownership control structure may represent an attempt to regain fit and to achieve profitable IEJV operation.
However, frequent structural reorganizations and control negotiations are associated with strategic, policy, and personnel changes that increase transaction, agency, communication, and administrative costs (Harrigan and Newman 1990, Reuer and Arino 2002) . Time, attention, and energy spent on renegotiating IEJV agreements divert partners from tasks that generate revenue and from activities that help the IEJV deal with competition Beamish 1997, Yan 1998) . During periods of multiple ownership changes, partners pay considerable attention to the effects of new control relations (Shenkar and Yan 2002) . As IEJV partners jockey for more control and power, emerging revenuegenerating opportunities are forfeited, normal interpartner routines and venture operations are disrupted, and relations with important environmental actors such as customers, suppliers, and host governments are left unattended as responsibilities are reallocated. As such, ongoing structural changes increase the negative effect of making structural adjustments at the expense of revenue-generating opportunities.
Because repeated ownership changes divert a significant portion of resources from operating to reorganizing, the continual change process reduces performance. Established structures and routines are disrupted during the change process and also while new ownership control structures and operational activity systems are being developed, these disruptions exert negative impacts on organizational competencies (Amburgey et al. 1993) . Because stable structures and reproducible routines form the foundation of reliable performance (Hannan and Freeman 1984) , IEJVs that undergo multiple ownership changes continually encounter performance problems. The following hypothesis addresses the performance implications of multiple, sequential structural changes.
Hypothesis 6 (H6). As each sequential IEJV ownership change occurs, the likelihood of achieving profitability continually declines.
Long-Term Survival. On occasion, IEJVs may be capable of managing short-term shocks associated with implementing ownership control changes, but long-term implications depend on how quickly the increasingly escalated short-term shocks decline after each sequential change-in other words, on the recovery rate. For example, if the rate of recovery becomes faster following each sequential change, then IEJVs may benefit in the long term by accepting the short-term shocks of implementing ownership changes. However, if the rate of recovery becomes slower following each sequential change, the short-term shocks will ultimately translate into lower survival likelihood.
As argued above, increasingly unstable inter-partner relationships during the process of multiple ownership changes continually reduce the rate of recovery following each sequential change. When an IEJV agreement is renegotiated too often, political dynamics between partners tend to render proposals by one partner politically suspect (Yan 1998) , making the other partner feel defensive about the potential for being cheated or for making strategic or tactical mistakes (Shenkar and Yan 2002) . Perceptions of inequality can in turn prompt actions aimed at retaliation or correction (Hambrick et al. 2001) . Escalation of such actions between IEJV partners can trigger a downward spiral of inter-partner conflict toward IEJV instability Beamish 1997, Parkhe 1993b) . It is therefore expected that as each sequential ownership change occurs, recovery following each round of ownership change tends to be slower than for the preceding round. Accordingly, disruptive ownership changes in the short term will not be adaptive in the long term. Instead, when multiple ownership changes occur, the risk of relationship termination continually escalates. This idea is expressed in the final hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). As each sequential ownership change occurs, the risk of IEJV relationship termination continually escalates.
Methodology Data and Sample
The IEJV sample was drawn from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran, Kuni-Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments by Country), published annually by Toyo Keizai, Inc. (TK data hereafter). The annual survey presents information gathered from the general managers of Japanese overseas IEJVs whose parent firms are listed on the Tokyo, Osaka, or Nagoya stock exchanges. Using IEJV names, parent names, and country locations as key identifiers, data from annual editions between 1986 and 2003 were compiled and used to construct longitudinal IEJV profiles. Some IEJVs were formed and may have changed their ownership structures prior to 1986. Because it could not be determined whether an IEJV had changed ownership structure before the observation period, IEJVs in existence prior to 1986 were excluded. Further, partners tend to be more tolerant of poor IEJV performance in the early years of an agreement-a tolerance referred to as "the honeymoon effect" (Park and Russo 1996) . In accordance with the Woodcock et al. (1998) Figure 2 compares the temporal pattern of structural change with the temporal pattern of termination.
1 In Figure 3 , the overall temporal pattern of structural change depicted in Figure 2 is decomposed into four separate temporal patterns in terms of sequential structural changes. 
Variables
Changes in IEJV Ownership Structure. Changes in the relative ownership levels of existing partners served as both dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable was operationalized as an ordered and repeatable event variable, whose defining characteristic is that a subject can only experience one event at any given time, because events occur in a sequentially ordered process. Ownership change events were therefore constructed as ordered, multiple, and with a natural sequence. Ordered repeatable event data represent dynamic processes that evolve over time. To express ordered repeatable events of ownership change, the C ik event variable was used to denote event time for the No. of IEJV terminations 1st structural change 2nd structural change 3rd structural change 4th structural change IEJV termination
Change characteristics such as direction (increase or decrease), magnitude (how much), or destination (from which partner to the other) were not included in this study, for three reasons. First, the trap of continual change posits that regardless of such change characteristics, continual change increases the risk of organizational failure. In other words, regardless of the type of motivation behind a change, or belief in the positive effects of occasional change, it is unlikely that continual change is beneficial for IEJVs. Second, the trap of continual change conceptualizes change implications at the focal organization level (i.e., IEJVs) rather than at the level of the investing constituencies (i.e., parent firms). Because the level of analysis is the IEJV, this article focuses on ownership change events at the IEJV level rather than on specific change characteristics, which can vary according to the perspective of a particular parent firm. It is not technically possible to incorporate different directions, magnitudes, or destinations from different partner perspectives while maintaining the IEJV as the level of analysis. Third, this is the first large-sample IEJV study to investigate multiple waves of ownership change. This study represents an initial step toward developing a general model of multiple ownership changes by focusing on general change events. Once a general model is established, researchers can analyze specific change characteristics to enrich or refute it.
The independent ownership change variable was operationalized as a state-dependent variable. State dependency refers to situations where the probability of an IEJV experiencing a future ownership change event is influenced by the occurrence of previous ownership change events. The state-dependent configuration represents a special type of event history data (one that records the timing of transitions between two or more discrete states) and emphasizes a causal ordering of events and a chain of stages, with each change event serving as a necessary precursor to the next. In the multiple failure time data used in this study, the mean duration time between ownership change events is modified by the occurrence of previous events. The state-dependent effects of multiple and sequential ownership changes were tested by jointly modeling transitions from one state to another, operationalizing the state-dependent covariate function Z(t as follows:
Z t = 0 if t ≤ time at which the first ownership change occurs, = 1 if t > time at which the first ownership change occurs and if t ≤ time at which the second ownership change occurs, = 2 if t > time at which the second ownership change occurs and if t ≤ time at which the third ownership change occurs, = 3 if t > time at which the third ownership change occurs and if t ≤ time at which the fourth ownership change occurs, and = 4 if t > time at which the fourth ownership change occurs and if t ≤ time at which the fifth ownership change occurs.
IEJV Performance. IEJV performance served as both dependent and independent variables. IEJV financial profitability was used to operationalize IEJV performance. In the TK data, IEJV profitability is based on managerial reports-that is, a perceptual assessment of venture performance rendered by the IEJV's general manager. The variable reported in the TK data has three ordinal levels: loss, break-even, and gain. Ordinal IEJV profitability was used as an independent variable for investigating the effect of prior IEJV performance at time (t − 1) on initial change in ownership structure at time (t) (H1). Ordinal IEJV profitability served as a dependent variable for investigating the effects of ownership change at time (t) on short-term IEJV performance at time (t + 1) (H6). The performance variables were lagged by one year.
Given that unconsolidated financial reports of IEJV profitability are seldom available, managerial reports offer the best alternative for analyzing data from a large sample over an extended time period. Previous research (Dess and Robinson 1984, Geringer and Hebert 1991) has validated this perceptual measure of performance (i.e., high degree of correlation in studies comparing perceptual assessments of financial performance with accounting measures). Furthermore, prior studies on Japanese IEJV performance have verified and confirmed the validity and reliability of such a measure in Japanese empirical settings Beamish 2001, Woodcock et al. 1994) . Even if accounting measures were available, standardized managerial reports may be more reliable, because accounting systems and conventions used in different countries often present challenges to comparing inter-country financial performance. In addition, corporate financial data may not accurately reflect the performance of individual IEJVs because of complex transfer pricing and corporate tax policies.
IEJV Termination. For the long-term outcomes of multiple ownership changes, IEJV termination was operationalized as the eventual demise of an IEJV relationship. Unlike ownership change events, IEJV relationship termination is a nonrepeatable event-that is, individual IEJVs either survived to 2003 or were terminated prior to 2003. The T it dependent variable of IEJV termination equaled 1 if IEJV i was terminated by time (t) and 0 otherwise. Observations were right-censored in 2003 if the indicator variable T it = 0 in every year for IEJV i . IEJV termination was used as an indicator of long-term organizational performance. Even if termination may not be fully equated with failure, an IEJV can be expected to remain in operation if it continues to represent the most efficient form of organization (Inkpen and Beamish 1997) . As such, a case of sell-off to a third party implies a competitive setback (Park and Russo 1996) . Kogut (1991) also asserts that situations in which an IEJV partner acquires the entire venture indicate failure on the part of the IEJV to adequately adjust to emerging and evolving contingencies. Makino et al. (2007) use Japanese IEJV data to illustrate that more than 90% of all IEJV terminations are unplanned and unexpected.
Shared Equity Ownership. Extent of shared equity ownership was used to investigate interaction effects between prior ownership changes and shared equity ownership control on subsequent ownership changes. Past IEJV researchers have focused primarily on IEJVs consisting of one foreign and one local partner, and have coarsely classified equity ownership configurations as majority-owned, equally-owned, or minority-ownedmostly from the foreign partner's perspective. However, Makino and Beamish (1998) report that only 30% of the 737 Japanese IEJVs they reviewed had such formats. In cases where three or more IEJV partners are involved, such conventional equity ownership categories cannot be applied.
Accordingly, this study develops a general measure of the extent of shared equity ownership from the perspective of all partners involved. The entropy measure used in diversification research provides a starting point for operationalizing the extent of shared equity ownership control between/among IEJV partners. In the same manner that the number of business segments and extent of operational distribution across those segments are critical dimensions of the diversification entropy measure, the number of IEJV partners and the distribution of equity ownership among those partners are critical dimensions for calculating the extent of equity ownership distribution. However, the conventional entropy measure of diversification has two important limitations (Raghunathan 1995) . First, its inherent coarseness prevents it from capturing the multidimensionality of the diversification concept. The problem lies in its mathematical formulation, as it is not derived from the twodimensional diversification measures. Second, it does not take into account related and unrelated aspects of diversification such as within-industry versus betweenindustry, but instead directly measures diversification extent as if business segment categorization does not matter.
To address the limitations of the conventional entropy measure, the refined entropy measure of diversification developed by Raghunathan (1995) was applied to the IEJV context. This measure provides a more precise and informative value for the extent of equity ownership distribution than the conventional measure, as it not only captures the multidimensionality of equity distribution elements, but also incorporates the related and unrelated aspects of equity distribution based on nationality and corporate affiliation. For the corporate affiliation, we used the Japanese partner group classification proposed by Makino and Beamish (1998) . Using the refined measure, the extent of shared equity ownership between/among IEJV partners was operationalized as follows: Extent of Shared Equity Ownership
where P ij = proportion of equity ownership of the ith IEJV partner of the jth IEJV partner group, P j = proportion of equity ownership of the jth IEJV partner group, M = total number of IEJV partner groups involved, N = total number of IEJV partners, and N j = total number of IEJV partners within the jth IEJV partner group.
The value of the extent of shared equity ownership originates at 0, a meaningful point indicating 100% ownership control by a single parent firm. The maximum value is 1, indicating a completely even distribution of equity ownership between/among partners. Along this continuum, a higher value indicates a higher extent of shared equity ownership.
Control Variables. Various environmental effects were controlled for at the country level. For economic environment, a dummy variable representing economic development stage (Dunning 1993 ) and a measure of inflation rate (Grosse and Trevino 2005) were incorporated. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP), change in GDP, and population measures (Henisz and Delios 2001) were used to control for the effects of market demand and market potential. For institutional environment, the control measures were foreign firm ownership freedom (Chung and Beamish 2005a) , intellectual property protection (Oxley 1999) , and antitrust regulation (Gomes-Casseres 1990)-all based on data from Global Competitive Reports. Political environment was controlled for using political risk (Grosse and Trevino 2005) and government policy adaptation measures (Peng 2000) based on World Competitiveness Yearbook data. Labor market environment was controlled for by incorporating a human resources development dummy variable based on Human Development Report data (Globerman and Shapiro 2003). The control variable for cultural environment was a cultural distance measure.
At the industry level, two-digit SIC codes were used to control for 58 industry-fixed effects. One dummy variable was incorporated for high-tech industries, and one dummy variable for industry relatedness between the foreign firm and IEJV (Kogut 1989 ). Annual exchange rates for Japanese currency were used to control for temporal effects (Klein and Rosengren 1994) .
At the parent firm level, control variables included the foreign firm's IEJV experience in the host country in general and in the specific two-digit SIC industry in the host country (Lu and Hebert 2005) , as well as the extent of the foreign firm's IEJV operations in the host country and the two-digit SIC industry, operationalized as the number of existing IEJVs in a given year (Henisz and Delios 2001) . Parent firm capitalization, number of parent firm employees, and parent firm age were controlled for, as were firm-specific effects such as resources available to IEJVs and parent firm multinational activity patterns (Dunning 1993) . Finally, return on sales was used to control for the parent firm's annual profitability.
At the IEJV level, IEJV age and size were controlled for (Hannan and Freeman 1984) , with size entailing measures of the number of IEJV employees and IEJV capitalization. Also controlled for were the time since last change (Amburgey et al. 1993 ) and foreign partner ownership share (Blodgett 1992) . A control variable in the multiple changes model was the effect of performance feedback on subsequent changes (Yan and Gray 1994) , and in the performance model the carryover effect of prior performance on subsequent performance. The number of expatriate managers in an IEJV was used to control for human resource strategy (Chung and Beamish 2005b) . The nationality of the general manager who either responded to the survey or approved the content of the survey response was controlled for to guard against a potential bias in the managerial report on IEJV profitability. Finally, we controlled for absolute IEJV sales levels, because perceptual profitability might have been prone to inflation/deflation in terms of absolute IEJV sales levels. A control variable for the number of IEJV partners was not included, because it was already part of the entropy measure of shared equity ownership; therefore, including it would create a multicollinearity problem.
Data Analysis
The primary focus of this study is on events that involve changes in IEJV ownership structure and/or termination. A right-censoring problem was prevalent because observations were made for a limited period of time, during which events of interest may not have occurred for all IEJVs. The ability to use right-censored cases was thus considered essential because the majority of IEJVs did not experience ownership change and/or termination. Event history models address this right-censoring problem, thus making the coefficient estimation process efficient and unbiased. Because those models typically analyze the occurrence and timing of events that can only be experienced once, observed failure times were considered independent. Because H1 addressed the initial occurrence of ownership change only, a conventional Cox model was employed.
However, H2-H5 addressed repeated event data of initial and subsequent ownership changes in which observed failure times are likely to be dependent. Such multiple failure time data violate the assumption of independence, thereby complicating event history analysis. To model a causal ordering of events and a chain of stages, we therefore used the multiple failure time event history model created by Andersen and Gill (1982) , which obtains parameter estimates by replacing standard errors with estimates from empirical sandwich variance estimators. As an empirical variance estimator, Andersen and Gill's multiple failure time event history model uses the Huber-White sandwich estimator when estimating variance in the random contributions of unobserved factors. To investigate the evolving role of shared equity ownership whose effects vary depending on the sequence of the change event (H3-H5), we estimated event-specific parameters by interacting an event number variable with a covariate of interest Lim 1999, Ezell et al. 2003) .
Because the dependent variable of H6 is ordinal, we used an ordered logit regression analysis with the Huber and White estimator. This qualitative choice model is appropriate when a dependent variable of interest has ordinal properties but is not ratio-scaled. Because H7 addressed a nonrepeatable event of IEJV termination, a conventional Cox model was employed.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 1 . Pearson statistics were derived when correlations were found between two interval variables, biserial statistics when a dichotomous variable was correlated with an interval variable, polyserial statistics when an ordinal variable was correlated with an interval variable, and tetrachoric statistics when two dichotomous variables were correlated. Variance inflation factor and tolerance level tests were conducted as multicollinearity checks. The results confirmed a lack of multicollinearity problems. For empirical analysis, various control variables were incorporated before introducing the main variables of interest. Table 2 presents the empirical results for H1 (Model 1), H2 (Model 2), and H3-H5 (Model 3). Table 3 presents the results for H6 (Model 4) and H7 (Model 5).
The Model 1 results indicate that IEJVs incurring losses were more likely to undertake an initial ownership change than IEJVs that were breaking even ( = 0 246). The negative coefficient of the financial gain variable suggests that profitable IEJVs were less likely to undertake an initial ownership change than those that were breaking even. These results support H1; that is, the poor profitability of an IEJV triggers an initial ownership change.
The Model 2 results show that compared to IEJVs with no histories of ownership change, IEJVs that had undergone one change were more likely to experience subsequent changes ( = 0 593) and IEJVs experiencing a second change were more likely to experience three or more ( = 0 798). The likelihood increased even more for IEJVs experiencing a third change ( = 0 944), and was greatest for those experiencing a fourth change ( = 1 734). Combined, the steadily increasing coefficients for the sequential ownership change variables (0 593 → 0 798 → 0 944 → 1 734) indicate that the likelihood of ownership change in an IEJV continually increases as each sequential ownership change occurs, thereby supporting H2. To further verify claims about the increases in the coefficient estimates with increasing number of changes, we performed a Chow test, which provided statistical evidence that the coefficient estimates significantly differed from each other.
Model 3 was fitted with an entropy measure of shared equity ownership to test interaction effects between the sequential stages of ownership changes and the extent of shared equity ownership control on the likelihood of additional ownership changes. The first state-dependent parameter of the interaction effect (i.e., no prior ownership change × the extent of shared equity ownership) indicates that before an initial ownership change occurs, the extent of shared equity ownership control is negatively related to the likelihood of an initial change in IEJV ownership control structure ( = −1 225). This result supports H3. However, after an initial ownership change occurs, a statistically significant and positive interaction effect was observed between one prior ownership change and the extent of shared equity ownership ( = 1 792). This second state-dependent parameter of the interaction effect supports H4, which proposes that after an initial ownership change occurs, the extent of shared equity ownership control is positively related to the likelihood of further change in IEJV ownership control structure. In Model 3, the third state-dependent parameter ( = 2 232) indicates an increase in strength for the positive interaction effect between two prior ownership changes and the extent of shared equity ownership on the likelihood of further ownership change following a second change event. This strengthening continued after a third ownership change occurred ( = 2 623), and the strongest interaction effect was observed after a fourth ownership change ( = 5 050). Combined, the results show that as each sequential ownership change occurred, the positive relationship between the extent of shared equity ownership and the likelihood of further change continually escalated (1 792 → 2 232 → 2 623 → 5 050), thus supporting H5. The Chow test results indicated that the coefficient estimates were significantly different from each other.
The Model 4 results indicate that when IEJVs in the sample underwent ownership change once or twice, the likelihood of achieving profitable operations did not significantly decrease. However, when IEJVs experienced ownership change more than twice, they were significantly less likely to be profitable. The negative coefficient of the third state-dependent parameter ( = −0 952) indicates that compared to IEJVs that had not gone through any ownership changes, IEJVs that had experienced a third ownership change were significantly less likely to be profitable. The lower negative coefficient for the fourth state-dependent parameter ( = −1 342) indicates that the likelihood of achieving profitability decreased further for IEJVs experiencing a fourth ownership change. Overall, these results indicate that the disruptive effects of ownership change became salient when IEJVs experienced ownership change more than twice. Thus, second ownership change was a threshold beyond which additional changes significantly and negatively affected the likelihood of IEJV profitability. The Chow test confirmed that the coefficient estimates after IEJVs experienced ownership change more than twice were significantly different from those with a smaller number of changes.
The above results suggest that IEJVs may be able to manage the short-term shocks associated with implementing ownership changes (especially one or two), but that long-term survival depends on how quickly they recover after each ownership change. As the Models 2 and 3 results indicate, IEJVs in the sample became increasingly unstable as each sequential change occurred, thus slowing the rate of recovery after each event. These effects gave rise to the long-term survival outcomes of multiple ownership changes, as shown in Model 5. Those results indicate that compared to IEJVs without any ownership changes, IEJVs with one change were more likely to terminate ( = 1 698) and IEJVs with two changes were even more likely to terminate ( = 2 101). The likelihood of termination further increased among IEJVs experiencing three ( = 2 433) and four structural changes ( = 3 146). Combined with the results for H6, this finding suggests that even if IEJVs are capable of managing short-term shocks associated with one or two ownership changes, this capability is not adaptive in the long term; instead, the risk for IEJV termination continually escalates as each sequential ownership change occurs. These results support H7. A parametric duration model was employed as a robustness check for H7. The log-logistic model results were very similar to those produced by the semiparametric Cox model, confirming the robustness of the results. The Chow test also confirmed that the coefficient estimates were significantly different from each other in both semiparametric Cox and parametric duration models. Several alternative explanations were controlled for. The reverse causality argument that a series of ownership changes may be driven by poor IEJV performance was controlled for using a performance feedback effect on subsequent ownership changes. Results indicate that partners were more likely to go through another ownership change if a venture performed poorly after a previous ownership change and were less likely to go through another ownership change if the venture performed well following a previous ownership change. We also controlled for a carryover effect of prior performance on subsequent performance. Results indicate that IEJVs making a financial gain at time (t) tended to be profitable at time (t +1), and those incurring a financial loss at time (t) tended to be unprofitable at time (t +1).
One may also argue that regardless of multiple ownership changes, the potential for organizational failure increases with age. The focus in this study was not on the aging process, but on disruptive processes associated with multiple ownership changes. We thus purposefully controlled for IEJV age and found that longer periods of collaboration help partners achieve higher IEJV profitability and mitigate the risk of IEJV termination.
Discussion and Conclusion
This is the first study to investigate the multiple waves of change in the ownership control structure of the IEJV.
We not only examined the antecedent of mid-stage structural change but also, more importantly, looked into the "black box" of mid-stage development to investigate the short-term performance and long-term survival implications of the continual change process. Much of the IEJV instability research focused on the evolutionary path taken by IEJVs that experienced no structural change in the middle of IEJV evolution (e.g., Barkema et al. 1996 , Hennart et al. 1998 , Park and Russo 1996 , Pennings et al. 1994 . But this research stream has conceptually assumed, rather than empirically verified, the evolutionary path of unchanged IEJVs, because it has been mostly limited to cross-sectional investigations or short longitudinal studies. Our study challenges this conventional assumption and investigates the underexplored evolutionary path taken by IEJVs that experience the multiple waves of structural change. Analyzing 5,053 IEJVs operating during the period 1986 to 2003, we found that the hazard rates of IJV termination vary, according to the IEJVs' history of structural change. Figure 4 illustrates the consequential hazard (i.e., termination) rates of IEJVs that experienced a varying number of structural changes. Figure 4 shows that the termination risk of IEJVs that had not gone through an ownership change initially increased and then declined over time, but the termination risk of IEJVs with multiple ownership changes continually escalated as the number of change events increased. At the point in evolution when the hazard rate of unchanged IEJVs begins to decline, the hazard rate of IEJVs with one structural change continues to increase. At the point where the hazard curve of IEJVs with one structural change passes the maximum hazard level of unchanged IEJVs, the rate of the hazard decelerates. Whereas the hazard of IEJVs with one structural change increases at a decreasing rate after the maximum hazard level of the baseline case (i.e., the hazard of IEJVs without structural change), the hazard of IEJVs with two structural changes continues to increase at the same rate after the maximum hazard level of the baseline case and reaches a higher hazard level at the end of the analytical time frame. The slope of the hazard curve (i.e., the rate of the hazard increase) for IEJVs with three structural changes is steeper and reaches a higher hazard level at the end of the analytical time frame. In the case of IEJVs with four structural changes, the slope of the hazard curve is the steepest and the hazard of IEJV failure reaches the highest level at the end of the analytical time frame. This article began by assuming that the initial action triggering point for structural change occurs when, in response to poor performance, IEJV partners change the ownership control structure of a venture in order to improve its effectiveness. As noted earlier, conventional wisdom suggests that if IEJVs respond to poor performance with adaptive organizational changes, the changes will enhance the venture's performance and survival (Koza and Lewin 1998) . However, our investigation has provided a new insight into the performance and survival implications of the multiple structural changes that occur as IEJVs evolve. Even if IJV partners undertake structural changes in response to poor performance, the benefits may not necessarily be realized, because the process of change itself can be so disruptive and deleterious. Challenging the adaptive viewpoint assumed in much of the alliance dynamics research, we introduced a new concept-the trap of continual change-in the context of IEJVs and emphasized a dysfunctional repetition of rearranging the structural arrangement, which locks the organization into bad choices and sends it into a downward spiral.
We found that the disruptive effects of ownership change became salient when IEJVs experienced ownership change more than twice (i.e., second ownership change was a threshold beyond which additional changes significantly and negatively affected IEJV profitability). This result suggests that IEJVs may be able to manage the short-term shocks associated with implementing a small number of ownership changes (one or two), but long-term survival depends on how quickly they recover after each ownership change. As the results of our investigation indicate, IEJVs became increasingly unstable as each sequential change occurred. This suggests that recovery following each round of ownership change tends to be slower than for the preceding round. As a result, disruptive ownership changes in the short term will not be adaptive in the long term. Accordingly, we found that the risk of IJEV termination continually escalated as multiple, sequential changes occurred. Our results suggest that regardless of the drivers of change or whether occasional change might be a good thing, it is hard to see continual changes as a positive for IEJVs in the long run.
To further explain why some IEJVs fall into the downward spiral of multiple structural changes despite potentially detrimental outcomes, we added an interaction explanation based on the division of equity ownership control. The IEJV instability literature conceptualizes the cooperative versus competitive dynamics of the interpartner relationship, and this conceptualization is based on the dual implications of shared equity ownership division. An evenly divided ownership structure between partners creates an environment of mutual interdependence and forbearance that emphasizes goodwill, collective interests, and mutual benefits, but it also increases the potential for substantive and relationship conflicts that result in opportunism, zero-sum games, and private benefits. In this study, we incorporated the dual implications of shared ownership control on instability in the context of multiple ownership changes.
Until now, the relationship has been viewed as equivocal, with some arguing that if ownership control is more evenly shared between partners, it is more likely to create conditions of mutual interdependence and forbearance and therefore lends stability to the IEJV Banks 1987, Reuer et al. 2002) . Others argue that evenly shared ownership control is in fact more likely to incur relationship instability due to inter-partner conflicts (Killing 1983 , Hambrick et al. 2001 . Taking generally static approaches, the two different camps of IEJV researchers have used opposing perspectives on the nature of shared ownership control to examine the "if" aspect of shared ownership control and instability. In this article, we attempted to answer the "when" question of shared ownership control in the context of multiple ownership changes via Poole and Van de Ven's (1989) temporal separation approach. The significance of this study is in temporarily separating the paradoxical aspects of shared ownership control and reconciling the two opposing viewpoints on shared ownership control in the evolutionary context of multiple ownership changes.
Another contribution is our linking of the wellestablished research stream on IEJV termination (e.g., Harrigan 1988 , Hennart et al. 1998 , Kogut 1988 ) and the emerging stream on mid-stage changes (e.g., Dussauge et al. 2000 , Reuer and Arino 2002 . Previous IEJV termination research has been dominated by a static focus on end consequences (Doz 1996 , Parkhe 1993a . Although the emerging stream rightfully emphasizes mid-stage changes in IEJV evolution, it treats the consequences of mid-stage development as a single, isolated event without considering subsequent changes beyond the initial post-formation change. We investigated the relationship between sequential midstage changes and eventual termination, and found that greater mid-stage instability leads to a higher likelihood of eventual termination. Because multiple renegotiations reflect consistent problems, the likelihood of termination escalates with each sequential change. Our investigation is important because the previous IEJV instability research overlooked the presence of mid-stage changes and their effect on termination, whereas the emerging stream on mid-stage changes overlooked the effects of post-formation changes on the eventual termination of the IEJV.
This study also makes a methodological contribution in the form of a general measure of shared equity ownership from the perspectives of all partners involved. We drew on the refined entropy measure of corporate diversification to operationalize an entropy measure of shared equity ownership in IEJVs. We also employed a novel empirical methodology-a multiple failure time event history model-to investigate variance in the effect of shared equity ownership control across sequential stages of ownership change.
In terms of managerial implications, managers have long been encouraged to alter their organizational structures in response to changes in internal and external environments. Such adaptive changes are both feasible and potentially beneficial because they maintain the fit between organizational structure and environment. However, the results of this study suggest that IEJV and parent firm managers need to be aware of the trap of continual change and its negative impact. Several examples illustrate this point. In 1987, the Japanese company Komatsu Ltd. entered into a joint venture with an American firm, Dresser Industries, to expand its presence in the U.S. earthmoving equipment industry. However, Komatsu Ltd. and Dresser Industries encountered strategic and operational conflicts with each other's strategic agendas and marketing priorities (e.g., dissension over dealership networks). These strategic and operational disagreements became personalized and emotional, resulting in relationship conflicts between partners. Along with a vicious cycle of inter-partner conflicts, the IEJV underwent multiple waves of structural reorganization, and the relationship was eventually terminated. In a second example, in 1986 the Japanese firm Hitachi Construction formed an IEJV with an Italian company, Fiat-Allis BV, to produce and market earthmoving machines in Italy. In 1989, the IEJV, Fiat Hitachi Excavators SpA, absorbed Case Corporation to become CNH Global NV. Shortly thereafter, CNH Global NV set up a new Italian venture in construction machinery. Throughout this process, Fiat and Hitachi reorganized their equity ownership relations multiple times to meet the changing contingency factors of the venture. However, these multiple waves of structural reorganization turned out to be detrimental rather than beneficial, and the IEJV was prematurely terminated. Similar cases have been also observed in non-Japanese IEJVs. AutoNova AB was an IEJV between the Swedish Volvo Car Corp. and a British firm, Tom Walkinshaw Racing Ltd. The venture was formed in 1995 to produce Volvo C70 coupes and C70 convertibles. However, substantive and relationship conflicts led to multiple waves of structural reorganization, as a result of which 800 to 900 cars remained undelivered, 1,040 employees were laid off, and the factory was constantly in danger of closing. In 2003, the joint venture was prematurely terminated. Finally, we suggest some avenues to extend this study. We did not emphasize a path dependence of ownership stakes (i.e., the effect of multiple ownership changes does not depend on ownership stakes having been more equal originally). Instead, we argued that regardless of the initial balance of ownership stakes, equal ownership is problematic after changes in stakes. Because this is the first study to investigate multiple waves of ownership change in IEJVs, our purpose was to develop a general model by analyzing a large representative body of IEJV data that contains a great degree of variance and observed diversity. However, the path dependence of ownership stakes may be a possible driver for the effect of multiple ownership changes. This issue deserves further research. In addition, replication of this study using different source countries would be appropriate.
1 Previous IEJV studies have not discussed the temporal pattern of structural change, so we begin by discussing the better known temporal pattern of IEJV termination. It is widely accepted in the IEJV literature that the termination rate of IEJVs rises in early years but then declines after reaching a peak Russo 1996, Delios and . Figure 2 confirms the nonmonotonic pattern of IEJV termination found in previous IEJV studies. We also found that the temporal pattern of IEJV termination was manifested in the temporal pattern of structural change. Figure 2 shows that the temporal pattern of structural change resembles the temporal pattern of IEJV termination. Change rates were low in initial periods, rapidly climbing to a peak, then slowly and consistently declining. In this sample, the number of structural changes peaked at year 6. Following this peak, the number of structural changes became inversely proportional to the age of the IEJV, and the number of structural changes decreased consistently from the 7th year to the 17th year. Structural changes most often occurred from the fourth through the sixth year of an IEJV's existence. This pattern of structural change activity was also consistent with research on Japanese IEJV performance that observed that performance stabilized in the third year of cooperation (Woodcock et al. 1994) , after which the long-term viability of the IEJV would be judged by its partnering firms. Figure 2 also shows that there was a lag effect between structural change and IEJV termination. Using the temporal pattern of structural change as a reference pattern, we observed that the temporal pattern of IEJV termination shifted toward the right and the nonmonotonic pattern of IEJV termination resembled the same nonmonotonic pattern of structural change. Our data indicated that although there was a lag effect of one to four years, the temporal pattern of IEJV termination followed the temporal pattern of structural change. This observation suggests that there may be a causal relationship between structural change and IEJV termination; IEJVs undergoing structural change may eventually be terminated. 2 The four temporal patterns of sequential structural change resembled one another in terms of their nonmonotonic line slopes and peaks. Figure 3 shows that the likelihood of the first structural change climbed rapidly after the initial two-year period of stabilization, and peaked at the fourth year. Following the fourth-year peak, the frequency of the first structural change event became inversely proportional to the age of the IEJV, and the frequency of the first structural change event decreased consistently from the 5th year to the 17th year. The nonmonotonic temporal pattern of the first structural change event was followed by the temporal pattern of the second structural change event. Following initial structural changes in years 2 through 4, the likelihood of a second structural change climbed rapidly in years 4 through 6. After reaching a peak in the sixth year, the frequency of the second structural change event declined slowly and consistently, with an upward bump in the 15th year. Note that this bump mirrored an upward bump in the 13th year of the first structural change event line. With this two-year lag, a wave of second structural changes in the 15th year followed a wave of first structural changes in the 13th year. Similarly, the temporal pattern of the third structural change followed the pattern of the second structural change, which in turn followed the pattern of the first structural change. The frequency of the second structural change event increased in years 3 through 6, and the frequency of the third structural change event also increased from the 5th year to the 11th year. After reaching a peak in the 11th year, the frequency of the third structural change event then became inversely proportional to the age of the IEJV. A similar nonmonotonic temporal pattern was also evident in the pattern of the fourth structural change, though the magnitudes of the line slope and peak were not as salient as those of previous structural changes, due to the smaller number of observations. The likelihood of the fourth structural change peaked in the 13th year. Figure 3 also compared the line slopes and peaks of sequential changes with those of IEJV termination. The gross temporal pattern of structural change depicted in Figure  2 showed that the peaks of both structural change and IEJV termination occurred around the same age (i.e., in the sixth year). However, the decomposed temporal patterns of Figure 3 revealed that the peak of IEJV termination occurred after the peak of the first structural change and was manifested along with additional structural changes. Although the number of IEJV terminations became inversely proportional to the age of the IEJV following the sixth-year peak, the slope line of IEJV termination showed that the number of IEJV terminations bumped upward in concordance with additional structural changes.
